New York Supreme Court July 1, 1841 (Tripp v. Cook)
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United States · · · 01-07-1841
On the case coming up for decision, Mr. Justice Cowen observed that, inasmuch as Tripp had suffered the bill to be taken against him as* confessed, he must be considered as having suffered a default, and therefore not entitled to prosecute an appeal within the decision of this court, in Rowley v. Van Benthuysen, 16 Wendell 369. Besides the application made by him was addressed to the mere discretion of the Chancellor, and he having seen fit under all the circumstances of the case to deny the application, it was not a proper case for review, as is also fully shown in the opinion delivered in Rowley v. Van Benthuysen. He deemed this a mere question of practice. The defendant complained that the plaintiff had proceeded in the prosecution of the suit, after having lulled him into security, and had gained an undue advantage from which he asked relief. How can this be distinguished in that point of view, from a motion to open a default unduly obtained. He therefore moved that the appeal be dismissed.
Senator Veb.planck said, that he could not consider this as a mere question of practice. He deemed it a question *151at an inadequate price, from whatever cause, is subject of pure judicial discretion in the court of chancery, and so completely within its absolute control as not to be subject to appeal. The case of Rowley v. Van Benthuysen, 16 Wendell, 190, and another case more recently decided, but not reported, are relied upon as establishing the rule in this court. Both those cases, decided that this court would not entertain an appeal from an order of the Chancellor refusing to vacate an order that a bill should be taken pro confesso, and to grant a party leave to put in an answer.
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