Court of Appeals of Georgia September 14, 1925, 16015 (Franklin Motor-Car Co. v. Chambers)
Also known as
United States · · · 14-09-1925
Stephens, J.
1. In a suit upon a promissory note given for the purchase-price of an automobile, a plea which alleges that the defendant, after having bought from the plaintiff an automobile and paid part of the purchase money therefor and given notes for the balance, returned the automobile to the plaintiff, and at the time stated to the plaintiff that he (the defendant) would not accept the automobile, and demanded of the plaintiff a return of the money .paid upon the purchase-price, and a cancellation of the defendant’s notes, and that the plaintiff accepted the automobile and “agreed to adjust the matter in a day or two,” and “has had possession of said car ever since said date,” sufficiently alleges a contract of rescission, in that it alleges a tender of the automobile to the plaintiff by the defendant upon condition that the sale be rescinded and the defendant’s money and notes be returned to him, and an acceptance of the automobile upon these conditions by the plaintiff. The ruling here made is distinguishable from that in the case of Hoffman v. Franklin Motor Car Co., 32 Ga. App. 229 (122 S. E. 896), in which it was held that a plea which alleges that the purchaser redelivered to the seller the automobile purchased, after the seller had agreed that if the automobile did not run satisfactorily the seller would take it back and “make some satisfactory adjustment” with the purchaser, and that the automobile was in the possession of the seller, is, by reason of its being vague and uncertain and failing to show a meeting of the minds, insufficient to constitute an agreement to rescind.
2.
Read the full text
This document is published by courtlistener.com.
Moonlit adds the citation network, article-level links and cross-references, which are available to search for free.
Sign in to Moonlit