Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit June 22, 1979, 20-1039 (Donald G. Klinestiver v. Drug Enforcement Administration)

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United States · · · 22-06-1979

BAZELON, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Klinestiver challenges the revocation of his Certificate of Registration on three grounds: 1) that the decision was improperly based exclusively on hearsay testimony; 2) that the findings of fact underlying the order were not supported by substantial evidence; and 3) that DEA violated 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1976) by failing to provide petitioner an opportunity to file exceptions to the Administrative Law Judge’s recommended decision. We consider each of these arguments briefly in turn.

1. Petitioner concedes that, at least in the absence of agency regulations to the contrary, hearsay is both admissible and may, standing by itself, constitute substantial evidence in support of an administrative decision.

Richardson v. Perales,

402 U.S. 389, 402, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). Nonetheless, petitioner contends that the applicable DEA regulation, 21 C.F.R. § 1316.59(a) (1978) erects a higher standard for the admissibility of evidence in a DEA hearing, permitting the introduction only of evidence that would be admissible under “jury trial” rules.

We disagree with petitioner’s reading of the regulation. Although the rule speaks of “competent” evidence, it does not further explicate the meaning of “competent.” Competent evidence is a conclusory term, synonymous with “admissible.”

See

McCormick on Evidence, § 52 (2d ed. 1972) at 116.

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“The word ‘incompetent’ as applied to evidence means no more than inadmissible, and thus cannot be said to state a ground of objection.” To say that DEA is limited to “competent” evidence is to beg the very question at issue here, namely, what evidence is legally admissible in DEA proceedings.

The history of this regulation convinces us that DEA never intended to bind itself to a higher standard of admissibility than that prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976), which permits the introduction of “any oral or documentary evidence.

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