Ohio Supreme Court June 13, 1979, No. 78-697 (Chickerneo v. Society National Bank of Cleveland)
Also known as
United States · · · 13-06-1979
lead-opinion
Paul W. Bkown, J.
The nature of a bank’s right to setoff was described by this court in Bank v. Brewing Co. (1893), 50 Ohio St. 151, at pages 158-159, as follows:
“It is said to be a well settled rule of the law merchant, that a bank has a general lien on all the funds of a depositor in its possession, for any balance due on general account, or other indebtedness contracted in the course of their dealings, and may appropriate the funds to the payment of such indebtedness. The right to make such appropriation, it is held, grows out of the relation of the parties as debtor and creditor, and rests upon the principle, that 'as the depositor is indebted to the bank upon a demand which is due, the 'funds in its possession may properly and justly be applied in payment of such debt, and it has therefore a right to retain such funds until payment is actually made.’ Falkland v. Bank, 84 N. Y. 145. Though this right is called a lien, strictly it is not, when applied to a general deposit; for, a person cannot have a lien upon his own property, but only on that of another; and as we have seen, the funds on general deposit in a bank, are the property of the bank. Properly speaking, the right, in such case, is that of set-off, arising from the existence of mutual demands. The practical effect, however, is the same. The cross demands arc satisfied so far as they, are equal, leaving whatever bal-*318anee that may be due on either, as the true amount of the indebtedness from the one party to the other.”
In Witham v. South Side Building & Loan Assn. (1938), 133 Ohio St. 560, at page 562, the right to setoff was defined as “that right which exists between two parties, each of whom under an independent contract owes a definite amount to the other, to set off their respective debts by way of mutual deduction.”
Essential, then, to the validity of a setoff is that there be mutuality of obligation. Thus, in Nichols v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1941), 137 Ohio St.
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