United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia August 1, 1985, 18-14330 (Searight v. Thomas (In Re Thomas))

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United States · · · 01-08-1985

MEMORANDUM ORDER

HAL J. BONNEY, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

[In which we elaborate upon 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(9), there being an apparent Achilles’ heel therein. A swift drunken debtor may not defeat an injured creditor through a technicality.]

The plaintiff is the administrator of the estate of Barka B. Searight, who was killed in a collision with the debtor, Enis Thomas, Jr., and by this action seeks to have the debtor’s indebtedness for this tragedy declared nondischargeable in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(9), the drunk driver exception to discharge.

The defendant has moved to strike (sic dismiss) the action on the grounds that § 523(a)(9) requires a prerequisite judgment or consent decree neither of which here exists. Does it? It might so appear:

11 U.S.C. 523

(a) A discharge ... does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt—

(9) to any entity, to the extent that such debt arises from a judgment or consent decree entered in a court of record against the debtor wherein liability was incurred by such debtor as a result of the debtor’s operation of a motor vehicle while legally intoxicated under the laws or regulations of any jurisdiction within the United States or its territories wherein such motor vehicle was operated and within which such liability was incurred;

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Congress is often the artful dodger, but is it the artful drafter of legislation? Here, I fear not. From a plain reading, it would indeed appear that the claim against an intoxicated driver must be reduced to judgment or consent

-prior

to the offender’s bankruptcy.

The 1984 amendment relative to the drunk driver exception to discharge was necessary because based on then existing ease law

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such a debt was dischargeable since under the law in most states drunk driving is considered only negligence and was not willful and malicious to reach non-dischargeability under § 523(a)(6). In other words, (9) now creates a presumption of willful and malicious action.

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