Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit December 8, 1987, 87-1444 (American Interinsurance Exchange v. Occidental Fire and Casualty Company of North Carolina)
Also known as
United States · · · 08-12-1987
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.
A trucking mishap has produced a dispute about insurance coverage. Walter Ragland, doing business as Ragland Trucking, owned the offending truck; Daniel Donnelly was driving the truck at the time; Ragland had leased the truck to Illinois Cargo, Inc. American Interinsurance Exchange insured Cargo; Occidental Fire & Casualty Co. insured Ragland. American’s policy covers a leased truck “while [it] is being used exclusively in [Cargo’s] business as a trucker.” Occidental’s policy excludes accidents that occur while the truck “is being used in the business of any person or organization to whom the [truck] is rented.” The insurers dispute whether the truck was being used “exclusively” in Cargo’s business, because Ragland simultaneously leased it to someone other than Cargo and treated it as his to hire out by the trip; on the day in question Cargo may have had no use for the truck, and at the time of the accident Donnelly was using it on an errand at Ragland’s direction. Occidental, for its part, denies coverage because Ragland was devoting the truck to business other than Ragland’s, and Occidental does not much care whose.
American commenced this case under the diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), naming Occidental, Cargo, Ragland, and Donnelly as defendants. It sought a declaratory judgment that (a) its
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policy does not cover the accident, and (b) Occidental’s does. Occidental filed a counterclaim against American, Ragland, Don-nelly, and Bobby Devers (the victim of the accident) seeking a declaration that its own policy is inapplicable. American, Occidental, Ragland, and Cargo filed a stipulation of facts, waived a trial, and moved for judgment. (Donnelly and Devers did not join this stipulation.) American, Occidental, and the district court have characterized these documents as “motions for summary judgment”, which they were not. The procedure was a bench trial on stipulated facts.
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