Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit August 2, 1989, 89-1056 (Shelly C., B/n/f Mr. And Mrs. Shelbie C. v. Venus Independent School District)

Also known as

United States · · · 02-08-1989

DUHE, Circuit Judge:

Shelly C. is a handicapped child enrolled in the Venus Independent School District (“Venus ISD”). Pursuant to the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act (the “HCPA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485, her parents appealed her Individualized Education Program by filing a request for a due process hearing before a Special Education Hearing Officer against the Venus ISD and two other parties (the “appellants”). The parties settled their dispute before the due process hearing was held.

One week after the settlement, Shelly C. sued the appellants to recover attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B) and moved for summary judgment on the merits. The district court granted Shelly C.’s summary judgment motion, awarding $30,583.62 in attorneys’ fees. The appellants appeal from that ruling, and also contend that the district court erred in denying their motions to dismiss

*863

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and for summary judgment.

I.

The law on summary judgment is succinctly stated in

Williams v. Adams,

836 F.2d 958 (5th Cir.1988):

A court may only grant a motion for summary judgment when “there is no issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party also has the burden of showing that these conditions have been satisfied.

Thomas v. Harris County,

784 F.2d 648, 651 (5th Cir.1986) (per curiam) Furthermore, in reviewing a motion for summary judgment, on appeal we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion, as the district court must do in the first instance.

Simon v. United States,

711 F.2d 740, 743 (5th Cir.1983).

Id.

at 960.

We will affirm a grant of summary judgment “only when the moving party has established his rights to the judgment with such clarity that the non-moving party cannot recover ... under any discernible circumstances.”

Clark v. Tarrant County,

798 F.2d 736, 746 (5th Cir.1986) (citation omitted).

Read the full text

This document is published by courtlistener.com.

Moonlit adds the citation network, article-level links and cross-references, which are available to search for free.