Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit November 18, 1993, 91-36290 (Chester O. Draper, Personal Representative of the Estate of Ilene Draper, Deceased v. Robert Chiapuzio, M.D., and Harney County, Oregon, a Public Body)

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United States · · · 18-11-1993

PER CURIAM:

Charles 0. Draper, personal representative of the estate of llene Draper, appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his action against Harney County, Oregon, 755 F.Supp. 331, alleging that the County, as operator of the Harney County Hospital, violated the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

Draper argues that the district court erred in applying Oregon’s one-year tort claim notice requirement, which provides that notice

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of a claim against a public body in a wrongful death action must be filed within one year of the alleged loss or injury. Or.Rev.Stat. 30.-275. Draper contends that ORS 30.275 is preempted by the two-year statute of limitations for suits brought under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(C). We reject the argument.

Congressional intent is the sole guide in determining whether federal law preempts a state statute.

See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra,

479 U.S. 272, 280, 107 S.Ct. 683, 689, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). In ascertaining this intent, we must respect legislative provisions that explicitly address preemption:

When Congress has considered the issue of preemption and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority, there is no need to infer congressional intent to preempt state laws from the substantive provisions of the legislation.

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,

— U.S. —, —, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2618, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (citations omitted). The Act contains such a provision: “The provisions of this section do not preempt any State or local law requirement, except to the extent that the requirement directly conflicts with a requirement of this section.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f). We therefore look only to this language and construe its preemptive effect as narrowly as possible.

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