Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit June 27, 1996, 94-55432 (In Re Delaurentiis Entertainment Group Inc., and Affiliates, Debtor. Liquidation Estate of Delaurentiis Entertainment Group v. Technicolor, Inc.)

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United States · · · 27-06-1996

TANNER, District Judge:

On this appeal, we must decide whether an action to recover a $3.7 million preferential transfer made by DeLaurentiis Entertainment Group, Inc. (DEG) to Technicolor is timely filed under 11 U.S.C. § 546(a)(1)

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of the Bankruptcy Code when brought by an estate within two years of the estate’s appointment, but more than two years after the commencement of the bankruptcy case.

When § 546(s) statute of limitations begins to run is a question we review de novo.

Ford v. Union Bank (In re San Joaquin Roast Beef),

7 F.3d 1413, 1414 (9th Cir.1993).

BACKGROUND

On August 16, 1988, DeLaurentiis Entertainment Group (DEG) filed a Chapter 11 petition in bankruptcy court and continued to operate its affairs as debtor in possession. On May 3, 1990, the court entered an order confirming DEG’s plan of reorganization, which provided for the creation and appointment of a Creditor’s Committee to act as agent for the debtor’s estate under 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code. On August 30, 1991, the Liquidation Estate filed a recovery action under 11 U.S.C. § 547 against Technicolor in the bankruptcy court. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the Estate, and denied Technicolor’s motion. Technicol- or timely appealed. The district court reversed the bankruptcy court and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint as time-barred. The Estate appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), and we AFFIRM.

DISCUSSION

Appellant argues that where no Chapter 11 trustee is appointed, the limitations period commences upon the appointment of the nearest functional equivalent of such a trustee, which Appellant claims is the estate representative. Our recent cases indicate, however, that we should focus primarily on the language of the statute to determine whether an estate representative is a “trustee” within the meaning of § 546.

In

Upgrade Corp. v.

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