Supreme Court of Arkansas February 15, 2018, No. CR–17–303 (Kellon v. State)
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United States · · · 15-02-2018
lead-opinion
Wynne, J., concurs.
Hart, J., concurs in part; dissents in part.
concurrence-opinion
Robin F. Wynne, Justice, concurring.
I join the majority on the first point, but write separately on the second point because Kellon's argument regarding his proffered jury instructions merits a more thorough examination. Kellon argues, as he did to the trial court, that modifications to the model jury instructions were warranted in his case. Specifically, Kellon contends that in situations where the elements of the greater and lesser included charges are identical, the jury should not be instructed on the order of jury deliberations, nor should the jury be instructed that it must acquit the defendant of the greater offense before moving on to the lesser included offense; he further contends that the jury should not be instructed that the subject of punishment may not be discussed or considered. This argument is different from a challenge to the constitutionality of our capital felony-murder *210statute, which this court has previously rejected. Hill v. State , 344 Ark. 216, 40 S.W.3d 751 (2001) (argument that capital felony-murder charge should have been quashed by the circuit judge because it was unconstitutionally vague); Cromwell v. State , 269 Ark. 104, 598 S.W.2d 733 (1980) (void-for-vagueness challenge, court held "no constitutional infirmity in the overlapping of the [capital felony murder and first-degree felony murder statutes], because there is no impermissible uncertainty in the definition of the offenses"). In looking at the specific argument made in this case, I see an inherent conflict in the model instructions when the elements of the two offenses are identical.
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